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for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of granting copyrights in the United States is to further
society's interest in maximizing authors' creativity. Granting property rights
to authors creates a financial incentive for them to develop ideas and produce
works of science or art.1 In order to ensure that such intellectual
achievements are eventually made available to the public, the property rights
given to authors are of limited duration; after the copyright of a work
expires, the work falls into the public domain and is thus available for public
use without restriction. Until the copyright expires, however, authors have
the sole right to exploit the fruits of their endeavors.
This fundamental policy of rewarding authors for their achievements in
order to maximize the production of creative or intellectual works is
theoretically simple and comports with general notions of fairness. A
significant degree of complexity quickly arises in the application of this
policy, i.e., when a court attempts to decide whether one particular work is
protected by the copyright laws ("copyrightable") or whether such a work
has been copied. However, even more significant difficulties appear when
one author utilizes portions of a prior author's work in a new work. Creative
works are not conceived in a vacuum; all authors draw on their predecessors
and contemporaries to some degree. This is especially true when they discuss
or criticize the traditions and society surrounding them. Enforcing the earlier
author's copyright in a work without exception and preventing subsequent
use of any elements of that work would actually stifle rather than foster
intellectual growth. Therefore, the crucial problem, which is the subject of
this Comment, is determining which author should be protected.
The doctrine of fair use arose under common law to resolve the dilemma
posed when society's interest in protecting authors conflicts with its interest
in allowing certain persons to make a productive and/or harmless use of an
author's work. Unlike the factual issue of determining whether a defendant
has copied from a protected work, the issue of judging whether such a
copying should be allowed is an issue of policy. Consequently, courts are
required to conduct an extremely delicate balancing of interests based on the
particular facts of a copyright infringement case in order to truly further the
objective of maximizing the creation of literary works.
1 See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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Application of the fair use doctrine has led to confusion in many contexts,
particularly in the field of parody. Two recent district court cases, both
involving the parody of musical works, illustrate this lack of uniformity
present in fair use jurisprudence. In Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 2 the defendant Miller used look-alikes of the rap group Fat Boys to
perform snippets of Fat Boys recordings in a television commercial; the
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Miller's fair use
defense. In contrast, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
held in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. CampbelP that the rap group 2 Live Crew's
unauthorized version of plaintiff's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," was a fair
use, even though the most identifiable parts of the original were used in a full
length parody. The tension between these two similar cases was disturbing,
but expected, given the history of the application of the fair use doctrine.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was presented with
the Acuff-Rose case on appeal. In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's holding, finding 2 Live Crew liable for its use of "Oh,
Pretty Woman." 4 Although this may have appeared to bring more certainty
into fair use jurisprudence by reaching the same result as the in Pan Apple
court, the decision was actually a marked step backward into the chaos that
has permeated the application of the fair use doctrine to parody cases during
the last four decades.
This Comment seeks to clear up some of the confusion present in the area
of parody. Parts II, H and IV describe the purpose of copyright, fair use, and
the application of these principles in parody cases this century. The Tin Pan
Apple and Acuff-Rose cases are summarized and criticized within the
traditional fair use framework in Part V. Part VI criticizes the web
comprising traditional fair use analysis and simplifies it into its two
supporting strands. In Part VII, these strands are integrated with an economic
approach to the fair use problem and a common-sense definition of parody so
as to develop a new theory for resolving fair use issues. Finally, in Part VIII,
the Tin Pan Apple and Acuff-Rose cases are resolved under the scheme
developed in Parts VI and VII.
2 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 972 F. 2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1292).
4 Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1429. This case will ultimately be resolved by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar. 29,
1993) (No. 92-1292) (granting certiorari).
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11. THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution provides that Congress has the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by granting
authors exclusive rights over their works for a limited time.5 Since the middle
of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the useful
Arts.' 6 Likewise, legislative history strongly suggests that Congress agrees
with the Court's assessment of the Copyright Clause's purpose. A grant of
copyright is "[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for
the benefit of the public." 7 It is a means to the growth of learning and
culture.8
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This constitutional "grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, reh'g denied, 465 U.S.
1112 (1984).
6 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954). The
Supreme Court first rejected the concept of a common-law copyright in Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
7 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
8 Some commentators have convincingly argued that this economic justification for
copyright does not adequately explain every contour of copyright law. For example, Alfred
Yen points out that a student who is required to produce a paper for credit at school, or a
government official who is required by law to produce a document, are granted copyright
protection even though the incentive to produce the work is not the hope of economic gain.
Alfred C. Yen, Restoing the Natural Law: Copyrfght ay Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
LJ. 517, 537 (1990); see also Gary Kauffinan, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of
Society's Pimacy in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 CoLUM. -VLA J.L. & ARTS 381
(1986) (tracing the history of copyright from its roots in England to demonstrate that much
of the basis for a solely economic justification for copyright is based, in part, on a
misinterpretation of case law, and an undue emphasis on particular language in the U.S.
Constitution and early legislation). But see Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
Anerican Copright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L.
REv. 1119 (1983).
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I. THE FAIR USE DOCnUNE
A. Judicial Development
Although "[tihe public good [often] fully coincides... with the claims of
individuals," this is not always the case.9 When an artist does not merely
copy the copyrighted work, but alters the work by adding something creative
(e.g., criticism, humor, abridgment), society's interest in stimulating
creativity favors both authors. The doctrine of fair use arose under common
law to resolve this conflict, determining when it is in the public interest to
allow one to make use of a copyrighted work without compensating, or
obtaining permission from, the original author. 1 This delicate balancing of
private and public interests, and the lack of hard and fast rules to guide the
use of the doctrine, has caused many courts and commentators to declare the
fair use doctrine "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.""
For example, the copying of medical journal articles by a government
library for use by medical researchers has been held to be a fair use because it
furthers society's special interest in medical research. 12 Likewise, society's
interest in public debate over the Kennedy assassination provided a
justification for allowing the use of frames from the famous Zapruder film of
the tragedy in a book criticizing the Warren Commission's findings.' 3 In the
parody context, television commercials made for the Coors Brewing
Company, which satirized a copyrighted character used in Eveready Battery
commercials by featuring actor Leslie Nielson in an "Energizer Bunny"
costume, were found to further the public interest in criticism and
entertainment.' 4
9 THE FEDERALisT No. 43, at 186 (James Madison) (C. Beard ed., 1948).
10 The doctrine is considered to have arisen in the United States in the case of Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). For a complete history of the
doctrine, see generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR UsE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
(1985); Abrams, supra note 8. For a succinct background see Wendy I. Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Berana Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1602-05 (1982).
11 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) quoted in, 3
MELVILLE B. NMMER, N~n~mR ON COPYRIGHT § 1305 (1992).
12 Williams & Willins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'dby an
equally divided Cour, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
13 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
14 Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 111. 1991).
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In contrast, using an abundance of copyrighted personal letters in a
biography of Stravinsky,15 assembling excerpts from books into coursepacks
for use by college students, 16 and using clips from a student film on an
Olympic wrestler by a television network 17 have all been held not to be fair
uses, despite the public interest in scholarship, education, and dissemination
of information. With regard to parody, a discount electronic chain's use of
the Superman character in a television commercial, although arguably
humorous, was not found to serve society's interest in criticism or
entertainment.18
It should be noted that fair use does not require that the use be creative or
productive. Verbatim copying, by photocopying or videotaping, is often
allowed when it is de minimis. For example, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,19 the United States Supreme Court held that
private videotaping of television programs, solely for the purpose of viewing
the program once later, is a fair use. Although the bulk of this Comment
analyzes fair use in the parody setting where a productive/creative use has
been made of the original, this should not be taken to suggest that
unproductive uses should not be considered fair; many of the ideas
expounded herein may be applicable to the unproductive use.20
B. Codification
The fair use doctrine is codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.21
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
15 Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).16 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d
57 (2d Cir. 1980).
18 D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
19 464 U.S. 417, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). Note that this is not a distinct
branch of fair use doctrine, but a way in which many results of applying the doctrine can be
categorized.
20 For instance, much of Part VI of this Comment, which collapses the four factors
into their core concepts, would apply to unproductive uses. Under the balancing test
proposed, an unproductive use would be less likely to be fair, because such a use would
probably be reproductive and would substitute for the original in the marketplace. See infra
text accompanying notes 104-18.
21 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The codification was solely intended to recognize the development of the
doctrine in the courts, not "to freeze the doctrine in the statute .... [The
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis."2 2 Despite declaring the intent to leave the doctrine in its
common-law state, section 107 can be read to clarify four points about the
doctrine. First, fair use is a complete defense to an infringement action.
Second, by offering a nonexclusive list of examples of potential fair uses,
Congress did not intend to require that a use fall into one of the stated
categories in order to qualify for fair use analysis. By the same token, a use
for one of the stated purposes does not automatically qualify as a fair use.
Third, by stating that a fair use analysis "shall include" consideration of four
factors, the statute does not preclude courts from considering others. Fourth,
the term "shall include" implies that courts must explicitly consider the four
factors, in order to bring more certainty into fair use cases.23
IV. THE PARODY CASES
A. The Early Cases
The first parody cases arose during the Vaudeville days, when performers
would often mimic other singers. In Bloom & Hamnlin v. Mxon,24 the
22 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975). Note that although § 107 does not include parody as an example
of a potential fair use, the House Report specifically mentions parody in this respect. H.R.
REP. No. 1476, at 65.
23 William W. Fisher III, Reconstnating the Fair Use Docrtine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661, 1669-86 (1988).
24 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
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defendant had sung the chorus of plaintiff's song, without musical
accompaniment, in order to mimic another actress' performance of the song.
Green v. Minzensheimer25 was similar, except that defendant had sung the
chorus and one verse of plaintiff's song. In Green v. Luby,26 defendant had
sung the entire copyrighted song with musical accompaniment. The courts in
these cases took the defendants' goal, to mimic the original performer, into
consideration;, they focused on whether the amount of the song appropriated
was "a mere vehicle for carrying the imitation along." 27 Only in Luby was
the defendant found to have used too much of the copyrighted song to
warrant protection; the court found that using the entire song was not
necessary to achieve the mimicry.28 Thus, the predominant factor in these
three cases was the amount of the copyrighted work used.
In Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.,29 the defendant had produced a show
entitled "In Cartoonland" which featured two characters called "Nutt" and
"Gift" who were obviously based on the plaintiff's copyrighted cartoon
characters, Mutt and Jeff. The court recognized that "[a] copyrighted work is
subject to fair criticism, serious or humorous. So far as is necessary to that
end, quotations may be made from it." 30 The court attempted to draw the line
between fair and excessive amounts of copying by looking at "whether or not
so much of the original has been reproduced as will materially reduce the
demand for the original." 31 Hill made it clear that such reduction must result
from consumer substitution of the defendant's product for the plaintiff's, not
from negative reaction to weaknesses of the original pointed out by the
defendant. The court found that the show in question would hurt plaintiff's
potential to market its own play featuring Mutt and Jeff. Thus, an analysis of
market effect served as a surrogate for determining whether the defendant's
taking was excessive.32
25 177 F. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
26 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
27 Bloom, 125 F. at 978.
28 Luby, 177 F. at 288.
29 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
3 0 Id. at 360.
3 1 Id. Note that three out of four of the fair use factors which are codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 are mentioned by these courts. See supra text accompanying note 21. Only the
second factor, the "nature of the copyrighted work," is omitted.
32 Hill, 220 F. at 360. Either determination could be used as a surrogate for the other.
Very often in fair use cases, the amount reproduced is used as an indicator of whether
substitution in the market is likely to occur. Also, the amount used is taken into
consideration in light of the first factor, the purpose of the use. In Part VI, this confusion is
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B. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit generated a great deal of confusion when it decided
Benny v. Loew's Inc.,33 its first modem parody case. Jack Benny performed a
take-off on the motion picture "Gaslight" entitled "Autolight" which
followed the original storyline but added gags, puns, mimicry, slapstick, and
distortion for comic effect. In deciding against Benny, the court held that
"parodized or burlesque taking is to be treated no differently from any
appropriation." 34
In Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.,35 the district
court that decided Benny encountered a similar fact pattern: Sid Caesar had
parodied "From Here to Eternity" with "From Here to Obscurity." The
court distinguished Benny because the "theme, characterizations, general
story line, detailed sequence of incidents, dialogue, points of suspense,
sub-climax [and] climax" of Caesar's skit were different from the original.36
But the court did not decide in Caesar's favor on fair use grounds, rather it
held that the numerous differences between the works rendered Caesar's
work not "substantially similar"; thus, it found a lack of infringement.
However, in dicta the court disagreed with its own Benny decision by stating
that an infringing parodist qualifies for the fair use defense if using an amount
of copied material which "conjures up" the original.37 Thus, the only
guidance these two cases lend to parodists is that the amount of the original
used will be determinative, but judged by a vague standard of "conjuring
up."
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates38 involved a cartoon magazine
which featured Disney characters engaging in drug use and sex. In rejecting
the defendant's fair use defense, the court once again focused on the amount
of the original taken and Colwnbia's "conjure up" test. The court interpreted
the test narrowly, treating the "conjure up" level as the maximum permissible
level of copying rather than the minimum amount necessary to create a
parody. Because the defendant's purpose was to parody not only the Disney
avoided by removing the amount of the original used as an independent factor. See infra
text accompanying note 113.
33 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided Cout sub nona. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
3 4 Id. at 536-37.
35 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
36 Id. at 352.
37Id. at 354.
38 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
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characters but also society at large, and because Mickey Mouse and Donald
Duck were widely recognizable by the public, the appellate court concluded
that copying the graphic images virtually verbatim was unnecessary to
achieve the defendant's purpose.39
C. The Second Orcuit
The Second Circuit's first modem parody case was Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc.4 Mad Magazine had published humorous lyrics in the
same meter as the original songs written by the plaintiff, Irving Berlin.
Although intended to be sung to the same tune as the original, the lyrics were
not published with any music. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Benny, the court
recognized that parody was "deserving of substantial freedom - both as
entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism." 41 The "conjure
up" standard, which under Colwnbia was the maximum allowable amount of
the original a parody was allowed to utilize, was held under Berlin to be the
minimum amount of copying to which the defendant, as a parodist, was
entitled. This liberal standard was qualified, however, because it was to apply
only where the parody was not likely to fulfill the demand for the original. 42
In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,43 the subject of the
suit was a Saturday Night Live skit in which the song "I Love New York,"
which had been used in an advertising campaign for New York City, was
performed as "I Love Sodom," with lyrics suitably changed for humorous
effect. In affirming the lower court's opinion, the Second Circuit implicitly
held that a work which satirized society in general, rather than the work
copied, would be treated just as a parody aimed at a particular work. 44 To
begin with, the court stated that "in today's world of often unrelieved
solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody." 45 In
addition, the court reaffirmed the "conjure up" test as a minimum allowable
amount of copying, with more copying allowed as the parody "builds upon
the original [by] contributing something new for humorous effect or
39 581 F.2d at 757-58.
40 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
41 Id. at 545.
421Id.
43 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).




OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
commentary."4 Moreover, the court ignored the qualification used in Berlin,
merely utilizing market effect on plaintiff's work as a factor.
Soon after Elsmere, confusion was created in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson.47 The
song "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C," from the defendant's musical
called "Let My People Come-A Sexual Comedy," used the music from the
song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B" as its accompaniment.
There was evidence that defendant only used the original in order to generate
publicity for the show. According to the court, there was no intent to satirize
either the original song or society in general, thus the song was not a parody
at all. The court, following Elsmere, rejected the district court's ruling that a
parody must specifically satirize the original song. Nonetheless, the court
then effectively contradicted this statement: "However, if the copyrighted
song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure
it up." 48 No case has given the Second Circuit an opportunity to resolve this
inconsistency; this issue remains problematic in that circuit.
D. Reconciliation
It is clear that for a number of years the Second and Ninth Circuits took
very different approaches and attitudes toward parody, most noticeably in
their treatment of the "conjure up" standard. Recently, in Fisher v. Dees,49
the Ninth Circuit mended much of the split by retreating from its strict stance
in Air Pirates. The defendant in Fisher included on his comedy album a
twenty-nine second version of plaintiff's song "When Sunny Gets Blue,"
substituting humorous lyrics and calling it "When Sonny Sniffs Glue." The
parody contained six of the song's thirty-eight bars of music (its main
theme).50 In finding fair use, the court established that the parody was aimed
solely at the original, implying that this was a condition of allowing the
parody to be considered for fair use treatment.51
The Fisher court then used the section 107 factors in its analysis, but like
many courts, ignored the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work.
Under the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the court
followed the Supreme Court's mandate in Sony that defendant's commercial
use of plaintiff's work would operate as a presumption against finding fair
46 d. at253 n.1.
47 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
48 Id. at 185.
49 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
50Id. at 434.
51 ld. at 436.
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use. However, the Ninth Circuit allowed the defendant to use the fourth
statutory factor, the effect on the market of the original, to offset the
presumption by showing that the economic value of the plaintiff's copyright
was not reduced. Because a comedy album with a twenty-nine second parody
would not satisfy a consumer desiring the original ballad, the court found the
commercial presumption to be rebutted. 52 Finally, in analyzing the third
factor, the amount of the original taken, the court retreated from its strict
view of the "conjure up" test in Air Pirates. It agreed with the Second
Circuit's recognition that a parody, due to its very nature, must be allowed to
at least conjure up the original, which the court believed the defendant had
accomplished. 53
Thus after Fisher, the Second and Ninth Circuits seemed resolved to take
the statutory factors (except the nature of the copyrighted work) into
consideration in parody cases. Although the common ground shared by the
two circuits could have provided more certainty in the area of parody, Part V
of this Comment shows that this respite from the confusion did not last long;
a district court in the Second Circuit would throw much of the statutory
analysis out the window, while soon afterward a court in the Sixth Circuit
would embrace the statutory analysis.
V. THE RECENT CONFLICT
A. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co. 54
The dispute in 7n Pan Apple concerned a television commercial aired by
defendant Miller Brewing which allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights
by copying short excerpts from various songs recorded by the rap group Fat
Boys, who were also plaintiffs. Defendants had contacted the Fat Boys about
performing in the commercial, but the Fat Boys declined on the ground that
they were not of drinking age and did not want to endorse alcoholic
beverages.5 5 In the nationally televised commercial, the excerpts were allegedly
performed in the distinctive style and manner of the Fat Boys by performers
who were alleged to be remarkably similar to the Fat Boys in their appearance
and dress. 56 Because the opinion addressed defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, for
purposes of the motion, defendants conceded copying but claimed that the
52 Id. at 437-38.
53 Id. at 438-39.
54 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
55 Id. at 828, 838.
56 Id. at 828.
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commercial was a parody of rap music, and therefore qualified as a fair use of
the copyrighted materials.57 Judge Haight held that the commercial was not a
fair use, and denied the 12(b)(6) motion.58
Relying on Second Circuit cases, Judge Haight did not find it necessary to
consider all four of the statutory factors prescribed in section 107 unless the
work at issue is determined to be a parody.59 He simply found that the
commercial did not qualify as parody because "its use is entirely for profit"
and alternatively, because the commercial does not contribute humor or
commentary. 60 Moreover, in the court's opinion, bad faith was exercised by
the defendants because they originally had been rejected by the Fat Boys but
nevertheless produced the commercial with Fat Boys look-alikes. Therefore,
because the commercial was not a parody and was not produced in good faith,
it could not be a fair use.61
Although a resolution of lin Pan Apple will be proposed under a new test
later in this Comment, it is useful to point out problems with Judge Haight's
traditional fair use analysis. Because Judge Haight did not explicitly balance the
statutory factors and used loosely defined shortcuts to reach his conclusion,
other courts will have difficulty applying his unstated analysis to new facts.
First, the commercial nature of defendants' use should not determine whether
the use is a parody. In Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,62 the
Supreme Court held that finding a use to be "commercial" creates a
presumption that the first section 107 factor weighs in the plaintiff's favor. The
definition of a "commercial" use outlined in Nation, favorably cited by Judge
Haight, is whether the user stands to profit from the use (not whether the user's
sole motive is commercial). 63 However, Judge Haight used this "presumption"
57 Id. at 828-29.
58Id. at 833.
59Id at 832.6 0 I.
61 Id at 832-33.
62 471 U.S. 539 (1984). "The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to
nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." Id. at 562.63 Id. Most "parodists" stand to profit from their work; thus, when using the Nation
definition as a determinative test of fair use, most "parodists" are presumed not to have
created legal parody. For example, the defendant in Fisher v. Dees would have been found
liable under this analysis, although three of the four fair use factors favored the defendant,
because that defendant stood to profit from his record album. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-53.
In fact, it is reasonable to assume that most writers, and artists generally, "stand to
profit" from their work. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which the
"commercial" presumption against fair use would not apply. Although recognizing that we
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as a conclusion of no fair use because he found that the Miller commercial was
produced "entirely for profit"; that the commercial was not intended to satirize
the Fat Boys, rap music, or society in general. 64 One could guess that Judge
Haight really engaged in balancing other factors when he reached this
conclusion, but believed that it was unnecessary to go through the motions
because whenever there is a commercial use, the other factors will not help the
defendant. Thus, the "purpose of the use" factor becomes determinative. 65 By
confusing a work's availability for sale with the defendants' nonparody profit
motives and by not making his assumptions clear, Judge Haight ensures that
another court with slightly different facts before it will have considerable
difficulty analyzing Haight's opinion, thus contributing to the confusion in fair
use law.
Second, previous courts used the fair use factors to determine whether the
work at issue was a valid parody-a fair use.66 The determination of whether a
work is a parody was never treated as a qualifying test to be passed before the
conventional fair use analysis was commenced. Judge Haight claimed to glean
from Elsmere the rule that a copied work "must be a valid parody if it is to
qualify even for consideration as an example of fair use under § 107."67 But
the court in Elsnere was clearly involved in the traditional fair use analysis
when it determined the "validity" of the parody.68 Judge Haight was probably
live in a society in which much entertainment and art for the masses is often judged by
critics to be of inferior quality because it is geared to the marketplace (e.g., an artist "sells
out"), the author finds it ridiculous to assume that one who makes money from one's art
does not attempt to convey anything of social importance.
64 Judge Haight relied on D.C CoGmcs for the proposition that "appropriation of
copyrighted material solely for personal profit, unrelieved by any creative purpose, cannot
constitute parody as a matter of law." 737 F. Supp. at 831 (emphasis added). It is not easy
to conclude that Miller's goal was solely profit; if it was, other effective advertising could
have been used without reference to the Fat Boys.
65 However, it would seem that the other three factors favor the defendant. Because
the nature of plaintff's work is creative rather than factual, the second statutory factor does
not favor the plaintiff. The portions of the Fat Boys songs appropriated are only seconds in
length. Finally, no consumer of Fat Boys recordings would find their desires for the music
satisfied by Miller's collage of Fat Boys snippets.
66 See discussion supra part IV.
67 71n Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 637 F. Supp. 826, 830 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). If a defendant with an arguable parody had to qualify as legal parody before
reaching the fair use analysis, no defendant would plead the work as a "parody." For the
court to step in and monitor which allegedly infringing works are parodies in order to
enforce the qualifying test of "parodiness" would be circular.
68 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745-47
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
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misled because Elsmere, like all other parody cases, treated the amount of the
appropriation as the most important factor. But in many of the cases, the
"amount taken" factor was either explicitly balanced against the other factors,
or implicitly balanced. For example, the "conjure up" test took into account the
first factor (the purpose of the use) and the effect on the market for plaintiffs
work was often a surrogate determination of whether the amount taken was
appropriate. 69 In Part VI, this sort of logical problem created by the interplay
of the statutory factors will be resolved.
B. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell 70
Plaintiff Acuff-Rose Music, a music publisher, brought suit against
defendants 2 Live Crew, a rap group, for alleged infringement of the plaintiffs
copyright in the song "Oh, Pretty Woman." 2 Live Crew's manager had
contacted the plaintiff's representative to notify it of the defendants' intention to
parody the song -and had offered to pay the plaintiff the statutorily required
license fee for the use of the song. The plaintiff responded, "we cannot permit
the use of a parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman.'" 71 The defendants released their
song "Pretty Woman" on an album which acknowledged plaintiff as the
publisher of the song and Roy Orbison and William Dees as the authors.72
Defendants admittedly copied the name of the song and key lyrics, but added
other lyrics with a considerably different theme. Musically, defendants
admitted using the same opening drum beat, guitar riff, melody, and chorus as
the original, but they also added additional sounds (laughter and "scraper"
sounds), altered the key, and frequently repeated musical devices. 73 Plaintiff
sued for infringement, and defendants claimed that their recording was a
parody and thus was fair use of the copyrighted material. Chief Judge Wiseman
of the district court found that defendants' recording was a fair use.74 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding no fair use.75 The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. 76
6 9 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32, 40-46.
70 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1292).
71 972 F.2d at 1432.
72Id.
73 Id. at 1433.
74 Id. at 1439.
75 1d.
76 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No.
92-1292).
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Both the district and circuit courts' opinions are exclusively based on the
four statutory factors; however, their application of most of these factors differ
in crucial respects. In assessing the effect of the first factor, the purpose and
character of the use, both courts observed the presumption against fair use
when the use serves a commercial purpose,77 as dictated by the Supreme Court
in Nation and Sony.78 However, the courts disagreed over the extent to which
the presumption controls. The district court tipped the first factor back in the'
defendants' favor by finding that 2 Live Crew's song is a parody, a socially
beneficial use, because "[tihe theme, content, and style of the new version are
different than the original." 79 The district court found that the purpose of 2
Live Crew's song was to parody the plaintiff's original.
The circuit court accepted, with reservations, the district court's finding
that the defendants' song was a parody, but required a much stronger showing
that the work had a character so valuable as to outweigh the presumption.80 In
a footnote, the circuit court explained that it would have found that 2 Live
Crew's song was not a parody at all because it was not "expressly and
unambiguously directed at the message of the original work."81 In coming to
this conclusion, the circuit court majority analyzed the lyrics of both songs,
finding that "[t]he mere fact that both songs have a woman as their central
theme is too tenuous a connection to be viewed as critical comment on the
original." 8 2
Interestingly, the circuit court majority ignored any musical similarities
between the songs in finding against the defendants on the parody issue.
However, when discussing the third fair use factor, the portion of the original
taken, the majority emphasized the musical similarities in order to find against
the defendants on that issue. In contrast, the dissent had no trouble finding a
close connection between the songs because both involve the singer
encountering a strange woman on the street, although in the 2 Live Crew song
the woman turns out to be ugly and the singer decides he is better off without
77 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993)
(No. 92-1292).78 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
79 Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1154. The court accepted the rule that a parody must
be aimed at the original rather than at society at large. Id. at 1155.
80 Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436-37.
81 Id. at 1436 n.8.
82 Id.
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her.83 Thus, the two courts purported to apply the same presumption in
analyzing the first factor, but came to opposite conclusions as to whether the
value of the alleged parody should negate such a presumption. This
disagreement was based on subjective assessments of the value of a putative
parody. The existence of a wide variety of juristic preference toward art
demonstrates that it is dangerous for the courts to be assessing the value of
artistic works; such a practice borders on censorship.
The circuit court majority, as well as the district court, accepted the rule
that for a work to be a parody, it must be aimed at criticizing the original. 84
The court adopted the argument that when a parodist wishes to criticize some
aspect of society, there are many works in the public domain which could be
used as the vehicle for such expression.8 5 There are two problems with this
rule. First, to require this of a parodist would to place a substantial harness on
creative expression.86 The best way to criticize contemporary society is to
make light of a work identified with that era. Too often, the owners of such
contemporary works are not willing to allow their work to be criticized for any
price: a prime example being Acuff-Rose and the rights to "Oh, Pretty
Woman." 8 7 Second, as evidenced by the split between the majority and dissent
in Acuff-Rose, a distinction between works using elements of another work to
criticize the original from works aimed at society is entirely unworkable and
subject to being dictated by the court's personal reaction to the parody.
As an additional matter, the district court followed the approach taken in
Fisher v. Dees allowing the defendant to overcome the commercial presumption
by showing that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value of
the original; that court found the presumption to be rebutted.88 The circuit
83 Id at 1442 (Nelson, J., dissenting). To support the argument that the song is a
parody aimed at the original, imagine hearing the 2 Live Crew song in a world where
Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" did not exist. It is likely that the song would be considered
to be silly and annoyingly repetitive. It is the association of the riff of the original with its
sappy, romantic lyrics that make the 2 live Crew version outrageous and attention
grabbing.
84 Id. at 1436 n.3.
85 Id. (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981)).
86 This could be considered a violation of the First Amendment, an issue which is
outside the scope of this paper. See generally Rosemary 1. Coombe, Objecs of Property
and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1853 (1991); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L.
REv. 1 (1987).87 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
88 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154, 1157 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar.
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court also seemed to accept such an approach. However, given its conclusion
as to the unfair effect on the plaintiff's market for licensing derivative works of
the original, it would not have found the commercial presumption to be
rebutted anyway.
Judge Nelson, dissenting from the circuit court reversal, made a crucial
point regarding the commercial presumption of Sony as applied to the parody
cases. Sony involved the verbatim reproduction of television broadcasts, while
the music parody cases are concerned with a transformative use which has
artistic as well as social value. "The cause that is ultimately to be served... is
'the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music and other
arts.' ' s9 In Sony the television programs were already available to the public;
in the parody cases, an entirely new form of expression is being introduced to
the public. Thus, Judge Nelson found that applying the commercial
presumption of Sony to Acuff-Rose, a case entirely different in its facts, was
unreasonable because the policies implicated in the two cases were significantly
dissimilar.
Both the district court and the circuit court succinctly found that the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, favored the plaintiff because the
original "represented a substantial investment of time and labor made in
anticipation of financial return," and because it was a creative work. 90 Such a
ground is baseless. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
investment of labor in a work is not relevant to the question of whether a work
is copyrightable. 91 Thus, it would be paradoxical to believe that the Court
could simultaneously believe that the investment of effort, in and of itself,
could increase the protection a copyrightable work receives under a fair use
analysis. Finally, a parodist may have expended a great deal of effort as well; it
would be unfair to only give the original author credit for his or her labor.
As pointed out by the dissent in the circuit court, the only underlying
consideration under the second factor which rationally related to the fair use
problem was whether the work was published or unpublished92 and whether
29, 1993) (No. 92-1292). An "unfair" effect on the market for the original would
presumably include only the effect due to consumer substitution of the defendant's work.
89 Acuff-Rose, 972 F. 2d at 1443 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
90 Id. at 1436-37 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981)).
If American copyright law does not recognize a natural right to own the product of one's
labor, this should not matter. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S.
Ct. 1282 (1991) (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" theory of copyright protection).
91 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
92 See Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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the work was creative or factual. 93 In Acuff-Rose, "Oh, Pretty Woman" had
been published for quite some time; this clearly weighed in 2 Live Crew's
favor because the original author was not deprived of his right of first
publication. Also, the fact that the song was a creative work arguably might
shift the second factor to a neutral position, or possibly in favor of the plaintiff.
However, as discussed below, to do so would perpetually prejudice parody in
the fair use analysis because parody has always been aimed at creative works. 94
Moreover, these distinctions made under the aegis of the second fair use factor
irrationally give weight to the original author's selfish wishes. 95
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, was found by the district court to
favor defendants even though they copied the most notable aspects of the
original, many of them verbatim. This is because Chief Judge Wiseman
followed Elsmere and Fisher by using the "conjure up" standard as the
minimum allowable amount of a parody (thus tying this third factor of fair use
to the first factor, the purpose of the use).96 Moreover, he recognized the
intrinsic needs of musical parody to track the original more closely. 97 Thus, the
third factor weighed in the defendants' favor.
The circuit court majority reached the opposite conclusion with regard to
the third fair use factor. The majority based its conclusion entirely on the fact
that 2 Live Crew took the familiar riff from "Oh, Pretty Woman" verbatim,
possibly by sampling (recording) it directly from the original. The court
reasoned that this riff constituted the "heart" of the original and taking it was
excessive. The differences between the two songs ("2 Live Crew's additions")
were only mentioned by the majority once, in passing. Notably, the extreme
differences in the lyrics were completely ignored.98 Under this analysis, one
may wonder whether a parody of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" or of any song
dependent on one musical idea could ever parodied. It would certainly seem
that using the core riff identified with the original is "necessary" in "conjuring
up" that original. As Judge Nelson pointed out in dissent, "parody cannot be
9 3 Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1443-44 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
9 4 See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
96 Auff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar.
29, 1993) (No. 92-1292).
97 Id. This was also recognized in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986).9 8 Acuff-Rose, 972 F. 2d at 1437-38.
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parody unless it allows the original work to shine through in a form which,
while distorted, is recognizable." 99
In assessing the fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work," the district judge recognized the
need for a broad definition of such harm to the copyright holder, because such
harm most directly impacts the incentive of the author. Despite this
recognition, the district court found no possible harm to plaintiff, who remains
free to market its own rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman" as well as any
additional parody of the song. Moreover, he agreed with the expert testimony
offered by defendants that the 2 Live Crew version of the song was most
unlikely to affect the sales of the original song.1°° Thus, the fourth factor was
determined by the district court to weigh in the defendants' favor. Because
Chief Judge Wiseman did not consider any other factors outside of section 107,
and three out of those four factors favored the defendants, he found 2 Live
Crew's parody to be a fair use.
The circuit court majority's application of the fourth statutory factor was
straightforward, and misguided. First, the court indulged in a second,
unprecedented commercial presumption. The court held that the defendants'
intent to profit from the parody made it very likely that the market for the
plaintiff's original would be harmed; thus, the court presumed that the fourth
factor favored the plaintiff. 10 1 Second, the court ignored expert testimony
which the district court found to be convincing: that the parody would not
substitute for the original in the marketplace. 10 2
Furthermore, the court correctly considered the effect on the plaintiff's
ability to market derivative works, including parodies; however, without any
analysis or factual support whatsoever, it concluded that such a market would
be disrupted. 10 3 This is circular reasoning because the very issue of this case is
whether the plaintiff's property interest in the original song has been violated,
i.e., whether plaintiff has any right at all to control the creation of parodies of
its original. Instead, the court presumed the very conclusion it sought to
deduce--that a market for parodies exists.
While it is conceivable that the existence of an effective parody may reduce
the ability to market nonparody derivatives of the original (such as
abridgments, sequels, films, etc.), that detriment would probably result from
the parody's criticism of the original, not its substitution for the original.
99 Id. at 1444 (Nelson, I., dissenting).
100 Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1157-58.101 AcufRose, 972 F.2d at 1438-39.
102 Id. at 1439.
103 Id.
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Acuff-Rose, as a plaintiff, should be required to furnish some minimal quantum
of proof to support the assertion that its market has been harmed. Without such
proof, the court should not have ignored the finding of the district court that
detriment to the plaintiff's market, through consumer substitution of the parody
for the original, was unlikely.
VI. REDUCING THE WEB OF STATUTORY FACTORS TO TWO STRANDS
Although both of the Acuff-Rose courts based their analyses on the
statutory fair use factors, they arrived at shockingly different conclusions. This
results from the statutory factors themselves; they are redundant,
interdependent, and to some extent, irrelevant. In determining whether a
parody should be considered a fair use, the author suggests that only two
factors should be balanced: the social value of the particular parody (the
purpose and character of the use), and the economic harm to the plaintiff from
consumer substitution of the defendant's products (the effect of the use on the
potential market for plaintiff's work). This reduces the fair use determination to
its logical essence, thus removing some of the mystery and uncertainty found in
the fair use cases.
A. The First Factor
The first factor, "the purpose and character of the use,"104 is quite
important because certain productive uses, such as parody, are socially
beneficial and should be encouraged. However, the "commercial" presumption
derived from the Sony case, which involved literal reproduction of works, is
misplaced in cases of productive use.105 Most creative endeavors, including
productive use of an earlier work, are made in anticipation of economic benefit.
To presume that these works are not fair uses is to contradict the purpose of
copyright: to promote creativity. Also, the Supreme Court was probably
creating the presumption because the effect on the market for the original (the
fourth factor) would automatically be injured when an exact reproduction of the
original was at issue; by definition, exact copies compete in the same market.
A parody rarely, if ever, competes in the market with the original, therefore, it
should not be assumed that the Court intended the presumption to carry over
into productive use cases, which vary a great deal from the facts in Sony. The
104 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988); see supra text accompanying note 21.
105 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyuight Law, 43
U. MWAIIL. REV. 233, 289-94 (1988).
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first factor, therefore, should always be considered, without the taint of a
commercial presumption, in a fair use analysis. Moreover, due to the special
social value of parody, this factor will always favor the parodist, particularly
when the parodist contributes criticism to the marketplace of ideas.
B. The Second Factor
The second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work" is rarely used in
parody cases. 1°6 In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,107 the court considered three
characteristics of the original in assessing the impact of the second factor:
whether a work was creative, as opposed to factual; whether substantial time
and effort had been invested in the original; and whether the original author
anticipated financial return.108 Because these characteristics are either irrelevant
to copyright law or derived from other fair use factors, the second factor
should be considered a nullity.
First, the factual nature of a copyrighted work was considered relevant in
Nation because the public has an interest in the- dissemination of
information; 1°9 such considerations are really directed to the purpose of the
use, which is considered under the first fair use factor. Second, the labor an
author invests in a work, in and of itself, does not create a property interest in
a work; the work must satisfy minimal standards of originality and creativity to
be copyrightable. 110 Third, the corresponding expectation of being financially
rewarded for such labor is protected under the fourth factor, which takes into
consideration economic detriment to the author.
The second factor appears to test whether the author's consent to the use
could be implied from the nature of the work; for example, when an author
publishes form books."' This idea clearly permeates the unpublished/published
106 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. Even in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the court purported to engage in an explicit analysis of the
statutory factors, it did not even pay lip service to the nature of the copyrighted work.
107 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
108 ld. at 182.
109 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60
(1985) (recognizing the public interest in dissemination as relevant, but not at all
determinative, in the fair use analysis).
110 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (rejecting
the "sweat of the brow" theory of copyright protection, and holding that creativity and
originality are constitutional prerequisites for copyrightability).
111 E.g., American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(finding the defendant's copies of architectural forms printed in plaintiff's book a fair use);
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distinction which has appeared in a few cases." 2 It would appear that the
creative/factual distinction which is often recognized under the second factor is
also aimed at protecting an author's work from unauthorized use.
However, the whole concept of fair use is that some nonconsensual uses
should be permitted. The primary beneficiaries of copyright law are the public,
not authors. Copyright law only recognizes the economic interests of authors;
in most cases, American copyright law does not provide authors with the right
to protect the moral integrity of their works." 13
When parody is concerned, it is not likely that the author of the original
work could be presumed to have consented to being criticized; thus, as long as
consent is considered, parody will always be subjected to an inherent bias in
the fair use determination. The creation of this valuable art form and effective
tool for .contemporary commentary should not be prejudiced. Thus, the second
factor, whose very function seems to undermine the purpose of the doctrine of
fair use, should not be considered relevant, at least in the parody context.
C. The Third Factor
The third factor, the amount of the original used, is subsumed in the first
and fourth factors; considering it again by itself gives it undue weight. 14 The
purpose of the use is taken into consideration when measuring whether the
defendant had taken more of plaintiffs work than necessary. A parodist
generally must use a large portion of the original in order to satirize the
original. Also, the amount of the original used is given inordinate importance
because it is often used as a major determinant for assessing potential harm
under the fourth factor; the effect on the market for the original is roughly
proportional to the amount of the original that is copied. Thus, the third factor
should be eliminated as an independent factor under the balancing.
see Wendy I. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM. L. Ray. 1600, 1641-45 (1982).
112 E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1984).
1 13 See William W. FIsher I]I, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1661, 1688-91 (1988). However, note that § 106A of the Copyright Act, adopted in
1990, provides some "moral rights" for visual artists. These rights are inapplicable to
literature or music.
114 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988); see supra note 32.
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D. The Fourth Factor
The fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work," 115 has always been considered crucial. The
purpose of copyright is to maximize creativity by giving authors an economic
incentive. 116 Thus, disruption of the incentive mechanism should clearly be of
weight in the determination. However, harm caused to the plaintiff from
criticism is not considered in the fourth factor; only harm created by the market
substitution of defendant's work for plaintiff's work is considered. Thus, where
a critical parody is at issue, this factor will usually be of little weight; a critical
parody, as defined below,1 17 is distinguishable from the original by an ordinary
observer, and consequently will not compete in the plaintiffs market.
Moreover, the success of a critical parody is more likely to depend on the
consumer's familiarity with the original work; thus, the parody may actually
boost demand for the original.
However, when a parody merely acts as entertainment, and does not serve
as a vehicle for criticism, it cannot be said for certain that no substitution of the
works will occur. For instance, there is a greater risk that consumers will find
their desires for the original work satisfied, or at least sufficiently reduced,
when the two works are in the same medium because a noncritical parody is
more likely than a critical parody to be funny whether or not the consumer is
familiar with the original. Therefore, because a noncritical parodist is
moderately favored by the first factor, and potentially hurt by the fourth factor,
a delicate balancing of the two factors must be conducted in light of the specific
facts of the case. 118 Although this will not remove all of the uncertainty and
subjectivity of the fair use determination, it will at least strip the statutory
factors of surplusage and expose judicial policy balancing more clearly.
VII. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PARODY AS FAIR USE: ENCOURAGING
COMPROMISE
The conclusion reached in Part VI is useful for clarifying the policies
which underlie the fair use analysis and should be explicitly considered by
courts. There is more that can be done, however, to solve fair use
controversies. The rules expounded below would force potential litigants of a
115 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
117 See infra text acompanying notes 133-34, 142-43.
118 See infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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fair use issue to negotiate in good faith, or suffer almost certain defeat in court.
This would hopefully keep some controversies out of court altogether. Thus,
before balancing the two fair use factors, the court should apply certain
standards that ensure that the litigants, in the eyes of copyright law, have a
good faith dispute.
A. Market Failure
Professor Wendy Gordon has suggested a useful test that must be satisfied
before the court begins its analysis: a defendant must demonstrate that one
"could not appropriately purchase the desired use through the market." 119
Gordon's rationale is that if a work is socially more valuable in defendant's
hands, the defendant should be able to pay for the use, and the plaintiff should
not be deprived of the copyright without compensation. In a properly
functioning market, this transfer should occur voluntarily. 120 Because this
reasoning seems to suggest that market transfers (compromise) should be
encouraged, market failure should be demonstrated before the condensed fair
use analysis is reached.
Gordon points out three conditions which frustrate any market:
externalities (when a nonmonetizable interest is not taken into consideration
during the parties' negotiations), lack of perfect knowledge (the identity and
location of the author, and the possible harm to the author's market), and
transaction costs (preliminary costs which are necessarily incurred before the
negotiation begins). 12 Considering that the type of knowledge necessary for a
defendant in copyright negotiations is usually obtainable with varying degrees
of effort and expense, it is useful to treat the knowledge problem as a subset of
transaction costs.
Gordon recognizes the "anti-dissemination motives" of plaintiffs in parody
cases as a common cause of market failure. 122 This term is used to describe
those interests that the plaintiff seeks to protect, by refusing to grant permission
to the defendant, which do not stem from a legitimate disagreement over the
economic value of the copyright to the plaintiff. In parody cases, a plaintiff
119 "Where (1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the desired use through the
market; (2) transferring control over the use to defendant would serve the public interest;
and (3) the copyright owner's incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the
user to proceed. ... defendant's use [is] fair." Gordon, supra note 111, at 1601 (citations
omitted.
120 Id. at 1615.
121 ld. at 1627-32.
122 Id. at 1632-45.
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usually will refuse to grant permission, no matter what the price, simply
because the plaintiff has an interest which is opposed to that of society: not to
allow criticism of the plaintiff's work. Such "moral rights" to control one's
work do not exist in American law;1 3 control over one's work is only granted
to benefit society.124 Therefore, a list of valid causes of market failure, any of
which must be proved by the defendant, would include transaction costs,
externalities, and an anti-dissemination motive of the plaintiff.
B. Offer of Reasonable Royalties
Melanie Clemmons is among the commentators who, on the surface,
appear to take a very different approach from those who utilize economic
theory.1 5 She begins with a threshold requirement that the defendant
demonstrate good faith by offering the plaintiff reasonable royalties. 126 Such a
prohibition of bad faith on the part of the defendant mirrors the
anti-dissemination motive of the plaintiff which Gordon considers to be one
cause of market failure. Thus, defendant's bad faith may be added to the list of
permissible causes of market failure. Analogizing to Gordon's requirement of
the plaintiff, the defendant can only use a legitimate disagreement over the
economic value of the right to the use as a reason for not settling with the
plaintiff.
In requiring an offer of reasonable royalties by the defendant, Clemmons
has clearly recognized a good method for parodists to disprove their own bad
faith. In determining what royalties are reasonable, actual or potential harm to
the economic value of plaintiff's copyright becomes a valid consideration, as
does the potential profit which the defendant expects to make. For example, if
the defendant does not make any profit on the use, and thus cannot afford to
purchase it, an unwillingness to pay will be considered to be a valid economic
reason for not offering monetary payment; however, the defendant must still
request permission from the plaintiff in order to demonstrate good faith. Risk
forces the plaintiff to think carefully before refusing the defendant's offer of
compromise; the plaintiff receives nothing if mistaken in believing that the
defendant's work is not a parody, but if the plaintiff correctly determines that
the defendant did not produce a parody, damages are awarded (which
123 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
125 Melanie A. Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHio ST.
LJ. 3 (1985).
12 6 Also, if the parodist is unable to find the author after reasonable investigation, the
parodist may deposit the payment offered in escrow. Id. at 16-19.
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presumably will exceed the amount offered by the defendant). Forcing the
parties to negotiate thus creates a likelihood that they will share in the benefits
of the use without the need for a court to decide absolutely in one party's
favor.1 27
C. Burden of Proof
I The defendant traditionally bears the burden of demonstrating fair use, but
some courts shift the burden to the plaintiff in assessing the effect of the use on
the plaintiff's market because the plaintiff is presumably more knowledgeable
on that issue.128 Requiring parodists to offer reasonable royalties forces them to
disprove the causes of market failure which they can unilaterally generate: their
own bad faith and transaction costs (because the plaintiff will have been
contacted). By the same token, once this burden is satisfied it would seem
equitable to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to affirmatively
demonstrate a proper economic reason for refusing the defendant's offer
(equivalently, the lack of an anti-dissemination motive). Also, a plaintiff should
be allowed to rebut the presumption created by the defendant's offer: that the
defendant acted in good faith. As will be discussed below, the defendant should
bear the initial burden of proving externalities (the remaining cause of market
failure), but the burden can be shifted to the plaintiff if the defendant
establishes that his work is a parody. 129
If the defendant does not meet the initial burden by offering reasonable
royalties, the defendant should not be foreclosed from demonstrating market
failure caused by transaction costs, plaintiffs bad faith, or externalities,
because only one of them is necessary to create market failure. The defendant,
however, would carry the burden of proof as to all of these possible causes,
because the defendant did not shift the burden by proving good faith. Thus, the
defendant is given an incentive to act reasonably and fairly, and the possibility
of compromise is increased.
127 ld. at 19-20.
128 See Gordon, supra note 111, at 1624-26.
129 
"Parody" is defined infra at text accompanying notes 133-43. Because a humorous
work is presumed to be critical, thus generating externalities, defendant can shift the burden
to the plaintiff by showing humorous effect in the work. Plaintiff then must affirmatively
rebut the presumption of critical effect. However, for purposes of the next step of the
analysis, the defendant must balance the two fair use factors suggested in Part VI. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-38.
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D. Defining Legal Parody
Like many other commentators, Clemmons reduces the question of fair use
to whether a work fits within a legal definition of parody because the statutory
factors are considered by Clemmons to be indeterminate; they usually offset
one another.130 Once again, what she suggests is not very different from
Professor Gordon's approach. In finding that parody is very valuable to society
and should be allowed under any circumstance, Clemmons is really making a
judgment as to whether externalities are always caused by parody. Thus, the
existence of parody could be used as a surrogate determination of whether
externalities, and thus market failure, are present. In such a case, a parody will
simultaneously satisfy the threshold requirement of market failure and
automatically pass the collapsed fair use analysis. 131 However, works which do
not fall into the parody definition used for market failure purposes (e.g., works
that would be parodies except that they do not criticize, but merely entertain)
might not pass the fair use analysis, and must be subjected to such analysis
whenever market failure is established by other means. 132
In constructing a definition of parody, I adjust Clemmons' definition to
approximate a common understanding of what comprises a parody. Clemmons
defines a parody as "a work that transforms all or a significant part of an
original work of authorship into a derivative work by distorting it or closely
imitating it, for comic effect, in a manner such that both the original work of
authorship and the independent effort of the parodist are recognizable." 133 This
definition has many strengths. However, for the reasons stated below, the
author suggests this alternative definition of parody:
A parody is a critical or comic work that focuses attention, by close imitation
or distortion, on the style or substance of a significant part of an original work
of authorship, in a manner such that the parody and the original can be
differentiated by an ordinary observer.
Clemmons' "significant part of an original work of authorship" phrase is
meant to assure that the original is not in the public domain and that the two
works at issue are substantially similar in the infringement context; if there is
no infingement, there is no reason to raise the fair use defense. The term
130 Clemmons uses "parody" as the only test because the fair use factors are always
inconclusive when balanced equally. Clemmons, supra note 125, at 14-15.
131 See discussion supra Part VII.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
133 Clemmons, supra note 125, at 12.
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"significant" is nevertheless used because it implies that the similarity need not
only be quantitatively sufficient; a small portion taken may be the "heart" of
the work.' 34 Because the entire work would always be considered to be a
"significant" taking, the term "all" is eliminated in my definition because it is
redundant.
The use of the word "transforms" really duplicates the function of
"distorting" and "closely imitating" and implies that a substantial quantum of
creativity is required. The terms "distorting" and "closely imitating" are
retained in the definition because they effectively emphasize the minimal
alteration and close duplication of the original which is often necessary to
create effective parody. 135 The suggested definition includes another
commentator's creative phrase to describe what intermediate goal these devices
fulfill: "focus[ing] attention on both the style and substance of the original." 136
Within her definition, Clemmons does not clearly indicate the ultimate
purpose of a parody. In her explanation she recognizes that the function of
parody is to criticize; 137 however, by only using the term "for comic effect,"
one may believe that she does not wish to exclude humorous but noncritical
works from the definition. Such solely humorous works should be included in
the "common understanding" definition of parody for two reasons. First,
entertainment has social value in our society; it has a "therapeutic social
function." 138 A healthy market for entertainment generally provides some
incentive for all entertainers, including authors whose work provides social
commentary as well. Second, the amorphous nature of criticism through parody
suggests that a court should not involve itself in measuring the level of criticism
present in a work, or even the existence of criticism in a work. Thus, a work
which is intended to be humorous, whether it succeeds or not, should be
presumed to be critical.
134 Id. at 12-13 (preferring "significant" over 'substantiality").
135 ld. at 13. The special need for the musical parodist to follow the original closely is
discussed in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986).
136 "Parody is a discrete work or passage that, through imitation, focuses attention on
both the style and substance of a source text and that uses comic techniques, such as
exaggeration and incongruity, to criticize the source text. Julie Bisceglia, Parody and
Copyight Protection. Turning the Balancing Act into a Juggling Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L.
Syw,. (ASCAP) 1, 23 (1987).
137 Clemmons, supra note 125, at 13.
138 See Bisceglia, supra note 136, at 35. The Second Circuit recognized this in
Elsmere when it stated that "in today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law
should be hospitable to the humor of parody." Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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However, if a defendant is seeking to prove market failure by using the
definition of parody as a surrogate determination of whether externalities exist,
this presumption should not hold. The defendant who cannot establish market
failure by any other means must show that the parody does have a critical
purpose to pass the threshold test. This is because a work which merely
entertains is not likely to generate significant externalities; the benefits of
entertainment are more likely to be monetizable and marketable. In addition,
such a work will not automatically pass the condensed fair use analysis. 139
Therefore, the parodist is given a greater incentive to make the offer. of
reasonable royalties, so that this critical/comic distinction can be avoided, and
the fair use analysis can be bypassed.
Another controversy over the purpose of parody involves whether the
parody must satirize the original work, or can use the original work to satirize
society. Some courts have argued that the parodist who wishes to parody
society does not need to use any particular work; the parodist can use a work
within the public domain to achieve the same effect. 140 This would be an
extreme limitation on what copyright is designed to promote: the creativity of
authors. 141 It would seem that a contemporary, popular work is a particularly
effective vehicle for social criticism, because the commentator is usually
dissatisfied with the present state of society. Most current works are not likely
to be in the public domain. Also, it is not easy to distinguish a critique aimed at
a segment of society from a jab directed at a work authored by a product of that
society. Once again, a court should not be relied upon to make this fine
distinction. Thus, my definition of parody does not limit the subject of any
criticism present in the work.
The final requirement in Clemmons' definition is that "both the original
work of authorship and the independent effort of the parodist are
recognizable." 142 It is intended to mean that "the ordinary observer, comparing
139 See supra text accompanying note 120.
140 E.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 47-48. Clemmons does not intend to exclude works critical only
of society in general. Clemmons, supra note 125, at 13-14.
141 "Suppose a movie wished to satirize the activities of the Department of Interior
under the administration of James Watt, and as a part of a satire on that topic contained
scenes of strip mining in the Rocky Mountains while in the sound track distorted strains of
John Denver's song 'Rocky Mountain High' or Woody Guthrie's 'This Land is Your Land'
were performed. Here the film would be legitimately using Denver's or Guthrie's work to
give a biting sarcasm to its message of parody. Yet, the song would in no way itself be the
object of the parody. Under such circumstances, the parody defense should be allowed."
WILLAMF. PATRY, THE FAR UsE PRmvLEGE IN CoPYRIGHTI LAW 168 (1985).
142 Clemmons, supra note 125, at 12.
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the original work or portion of it with the parody, [must be able to] distinguish
one from the other." 143 My definition uses the latter language because it is
clearer. This language is useful because it buttresses the requirement that the
parodist add something creative to the work (by close imitation or distortion).
Also, by assuring that the two works are distinguishable, serious competition
between the two works in the marketplace is not likely to exist.
VIII. TIN PANAPPLE AND ACUFF-ROSE UNDER THE NEw APPROACH
A. The New Approach Swnmarized
The new approach developed in Parts VI and VII requires a parodist to
satisfy two tests in order to be declared a fair user. First, the defendant must
demonstrate market failure (the existence of externalities, anti-dissemination
motive, or transaction costs), but may shift the burden to the plaintiff to
disprove market failure if defendant makes an offer of reasonable royalties.
Second, the defendant must pass the collapsed fair use analysis by
demonstrating that the work furthers a social purpose which is valuable enough
to offset any harm to the plaintiff's market created by consumer substitution of
the parties' works. Alternatively, a defendant may satisfy both tests by
demonstrating that the work in question fits the common sense definition of a
legal parody which, by definition, demonstrates that market failure exists (due
to externalities) and that the condensed fair use balance favors the defendant.
B. Resolving Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.
Under this analysis, the in Pan Apple case is a close one. Although Miller
clearly offered the Fat Boys the opportunity to perform the commercial, it
appears that once the Fat Boys turned down this chance, Miller did not offer
any remuneration for using Fat Boys recordings in the commercial that aired.
Thus, Miller shoulders the burden of establishing market failure. Because the
two parties were in contact, significant transaction costs were not present.
Also, because no offer was made, the Fat Boys' reaction to such an offer must
be left to supposition. However, it is implied in the case that the Fat Boys were
concerned about their image and principles rather than the economic value of
Miller's use; it would seem that they would not have allowed Miller to use
143 Id. at 13.
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their music at any price. 144 Therefore, it is likely that Miller could have
established an anti-dissemination motive on the part of the plaintiff, and
consequently market failure.145 Alternatively, Miller could have demonstrated
externalities by showing that the commercial was a legal parody.
As for the second step of the analysis, the commercial's intended comic
effect is apparent; comedian Joe Piscopo appeared in the commercial and is
named as a defendant. Without viewing the actual commercial, one cannot be
certain that the rest of the definition of legal parody is fulfilled, but judging by
the court's description, Miller's commercial is probably a legal parody. It
clearly imitates the style of the Fat Boys, but not so closely as to fool the
average viewer into thinking that the commercial is a Fat Boys video, thus
satisfying the viewer's demand for the Fat Boys' products. Even so, the fact
that the viewer may think that the look-alikes in the commercial are actually the
Fat Boys is relevant only in a trademark or right of publicity action.
Thus, the plaintiff then has the burden of proving the absence of a critical
effect. Once again this would be very difficult to resolve without viewing the
actual commercial, but because the plaintiff bears the burden it is probable that
defendant will prevail on this issue. Moreover, it is unlikely that a television
commercial would become a substitution for the Fat Boys' records. Thus,
under the balancing approach, only a very minimal critical effect is necessary
to tip the balance in favor of Miller. Therefore, Miller is likely to prevail, but
argument over details of the commercial not discussed in the court's opinion is
likely.
C. Resolving Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell
Acuff-Rose makes an easier case. 2 Live Crew offered the plaintiff the
statutorily required licensing fee (over $13,000) but plaintiff responded that it
could not "permit the use of a parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman. ' "'146 It is
144 One must keep in mind that the Tin Pan Apple opinion was based on a motion for
summary judgment. Because the court construed all of the facts in favor of the plaintiff,
there may have been more evidence of plaintiffs anti-dissemination motive than was
liscussed in the opinion. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp 826
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
145 The Fat Boys' concern with principle is irrelevant to the copyright action.
ppropriate relief may be available in federal trademark or defamation law, or state unfair
Dmpetition, right of privacy, or right of publicity statutes.
146 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Tenn.
)91), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar.
0, 1993) (No. 92-1292).
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apparent that Acuff-Rose did not want their song to be parodied at all,
especially by a band with the reputation of 2 Live Crew, and were not
interested in negotiating. Such a motive created market failure.
The district court went to great lengths to discuss the critical purpose and
effect of 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman." 147 Also, the court accepted expert
testimony that the two versions of the song were aimed at completely different-
markets, and that substitution was virtually impossible. 148 Therefore, the fair
use balance should favor 2 Live Crew, and their song is considered a fair use
under this new approach, as it was under the district court's traditional
analysis. This conclusion seems to be more reasonable than that of the circuit
court, which seemed insistent on ignoring 2 Live Crew's apparent goal of
criticizing the "white bread" song of the plaintiff.
IX. CONCLUSION
The most useful feature of this new approach is that it untangles the
overlapping and interdependent web of factors, prescribed by Congress for fair
use analyses, by extracting and isolating the two strands that formed that web
through mutation and reproduction. Under the new approach, most of the
questions one would be required to ask are not laden with the subjective policy
overtones that pervade the traditional analysis. The supposed "value" of a work
is not directly considered, and should be minimized; only the effect of the work
on its audience is relevant to the legal analysis.
Although the added economic analysis and system of burden shifting may,
upon first glance, reproduce the complexities of the traditional fair use analysis,
the author suggests that this is'only due to the vocabulary of economic terms
used. For example, it would be much easier for a court to determine whether
reasonable royalties have been offered than to engage in assessing whether the
purpose of the work is a worthy one. Similarly, it should be simpler to
determine whether a plaintiff faced with an offer of reasonable royalties has an
anti-dissemination motive than to decide whether the amount taken from the
original work is "qualitatively" entitled to protection (i.e., "valuable").
Although the new approach may prove to be imperfect, its adoption, at the
very least, would correct most of the confusion currently pervading fair use
jurisprudence and allow courts to come to terms with the core values which
support the doctrine of fair use. Indeed, results may substantially differ under
the new approach, as is apparent from the author's suggested resolution of the
147 Id. at 1154-55.
148 Id. at 1158.
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7in Pan Apple and Acuff-Rose cases. The proposed results in these cases appear
to be more agreeable; when there is an absence of harmful effects on the
plaintiff's markets, an anti-dissemination motive on the part of the plaintiff, and
a chance that a consumer will comprehend critical commentary in the
defendants' works, a finding of fair use is a just one.
Brian R. Landy

